“North Pole” was without question one of the most effective German counterespionage operations of all time— not so much because of the level at which it operated, which was not of the highest, but because of its complexity, extent, duration and the cleverness with which it was executed. It would have been unthinkable before the days of radio.

The British Special Operations Executive (SOE), during World War II, directed intelligence and sabotage operations against Nazi-occupied Europe from London via radio links to underground groups. It frequently air-dropped into enemy territory agents, equipment and munitions, as well as the radio operators themselves who were to work with underground groups. German Military Intelligence, the so-called Abwehr, was able in
Holland to capture and “turn” some of the British SOE agents who had secretly been dropped into Holland. By controlling and dictating the messages of these agents in their underground transmissions to London, the Abwehr enticed the SOE to keep dropping further agents and material, immediately apprehended on arrival. Over a period of time (1942-44) a large part of SOE’s efforts to support the Dutch Underground teas thus neutralized. This operation was called “North Pole” by the Germans. It was directed by H. J. Giskes, an Abwehr officer, from whose book on the subject the following excerpt is taken. “Ebenezer” was the name the Germans gave to the captured Dutch radio operator whom they had forced to cooperate with them at the time our account begins. MID is the Dutch Military Intelligence Service, working out of London with the British SOE. Funk-Abwehr is the German name for counterespionage units engaged in the technical task of locating secret radio transmitters by direction-finding (D/F) methods. And SIPO and ORPO are German police units working in conjunction with the Abwehr.

from the book London Calling North Pole.

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Our expectation that Ebenezer would soon be sent new tasks by Lon-
don was subjected to a difficult test. We had not yet had much ex-
perience of this sort of thing and the quiet interval seemed all the more
ominous by reason of the fact that we had incontestable proof that the
London Secret Service was carrying out operations in Holland without
making use of our “good offices.”

The first of these occasions was in early April. I received a report
from the gendarmerie that the body of a parachutist had been found,
the man having fractured his skull on landing against a stone water
trough. Investigation showed that the dead man belonged to a group
of agents who had dropped in the vicinity of Holten. In our efforts to
clear up this mysterious affair we turned for help to the local Luft-
waffe headquarters which gave out daily reports in map form contain-
ing details of all enemy air activity during the previous twenty-four
hours. The information on which these maps were based was provided
by air-observation posts and radar stations, which plotted the course,
height, circling positions, etc., of all single aircraft flying across Hol-
land. We were agreeably surprised by the completeness and accuracy
of this information. We found, for example, that details of the opera-
tions over Hooghalen and Steenwijk on 28th February and 27th March
had been fairly accurately recorded. And we were now able to confirm
that the dead agent and his companions must have been dropped near
Holten on 28th March. Through the Luftwaffe headquarters in Amsterdam we arranged for closer watch to be kept so as to establish the course of single aircraft, which we described by the word “specialists,” as accurately as possible. The evaluation of these daily reports, whose accuracy steadily increased, gave us a useful line on the operations which the Allied Secret Service in England had started without our knowledge. Another indication of secret enemy activity came from Funk-Abwehr and the FuB headquarters, to the effect that a new transmitter had been heard in the Utrecht area, whose radio link had been fixed by D/F as lying close to London. Intercepted traffic indicated that this was the same station as that with which Ebenezer worked. And to add to it all Heinrichs came to me in the second half of April with the news that Radio Orange was once more passing “positive” and “negative” signals.

From all this we concluded that at least one group of agents was working in Holland outside our control and that preparations for further drops had been made. All this made me very uneasy about our play-back on Ebenezer. Had London smelt a rat?

On 29th April Ebenezer received instructions to collect material which would be dropped in the previous area near Steenwijk. I was
pretty sure that it would mean bombs this time instead of containers, so I took full precautions. I borrowed against the day of the drop, which was 25th April, three motorized 3.7-cm. flak guns from Hauptmann Lent, the celebrated night flyer and Commandant of the airfield at Leeuwarden, which on the day of the operation were sited round the dropping area after dark. I had the red lights of the triangle fixed on posts so as not to endanger personnel, and arranged things so that they could be switched on from a point 300 yards distant under cover. The same was done for the white light. The flak battery had orders to open fire in the event of bombs being dropped, or if I should fire a red rocket.

We switched on the lights as the British aircraft made its approach at about 0100. “Tommy” flew several times across the area, but clearly missed his direction, as the lights were not being pointed at the aircraft. As he crossed the third time I went to the apex of the triangle and shone my white light at him until he turned on his correct course. I have to thank the absence of bombs for my ability to go on telling this story.

This drop was definite proof that London had not yet discovered our control of Ebenezer. I forgot, in my delight, the lamentation of the young officer in charge of the flak, who had not been able to fire, and
who might never again have such a prize held in lais sights at a range of two yards.

The development of “Nordpol” reached a decisive stage at the beginning of May. All that we had achieved hitherto could only have been maintained for a short while had not luck, sheer chance and ingenuity caused to fall into our hands all the lines by which the London Secret Service controlled MID-SOE in Holland at that time.

At the end of April London found itself compelled to join up with one another three independent groups of agents and one other isolated individual. Since Ebenezer was included in this link-up, we very soon succeeded in identifying the whole organization.

It happened in this way. In the period February-April, 1942, MID-SOE had dropped three groups of agents in Holland, each consisting of two men and a radio set. We knew nothing of these operations. Another single agent had been landed on the Dutch coast by MTB. The operations consisted of the following:

Operation Lettuce. Two agents, named Jordaan and Ras, dropped near Holten on 28th February 1942. Jordaan was radio operator and was to work in accordance with Plan Trumpet.

Operation Turnip. On 28th February 1942 Agent Andringa and his
operator Maartens were dropped near Holten. The set was to be operated in accordance with Plan Turnip. Maartens had an accident and it was his body that was found near the water trough.

Operation Leek. Agent Kloos with his operator Sebes dropped on 5th April 1942. The set was to have been operated in accordance with Plan Heck, but it was rendered useless by damage during the drop.

Operation Potato. On the 19th April 1942, Agent de Haas, using cover-name “Pijl,” landed by MTB on the Dutch coast. Pijl had no radio transmitter, but was equipped with a radio-telephony set capable of working at ranges up to five kilometres. Pie had been sent out from London to contact Group Ebenezer.

Since the Turnip and Heck sets could neither of them establish communication with England, these agents made contact with Group Lettuce, which was operating the Trumpet set, in order to report their mishaps to London. It was not clear whether or not London had told Lettuce to establish these contacts. A signal from Trumpet, intercepted on 24th April and subsequently deciphered, indicated that Trumpet had been in contact with Agent de Haas from Operation Potato, but that the latter had been unable to get in touch with Ebenezer. London
thereupon ordered Ebenezer to make contact with Trumpet by a signal passed to the radio set under our control, and the circle was complete.

In our judgment London had felt itself compelled to make this fateful link-up through the loss of transmitters Turnip and Heck, and because of Trumpet’s report that de Haas had been unable to contact Ebenezer, which was to pass his signals to England.

A loose contact between different groups of agents had the disadvantage from our point of view that imminent arrests could be quickly reported to London, thus making it difficult to play-back a captured transmitter. But if this contact became a close one, as in the present instance where Trumpet was operating for three other groups, the danger for all of them became very great should one be discovered and liquidated by the German counterespionage. It was highly unfortunate for London that our controlled station Ebenezer had been ordered to make these contacts just at the moment when the groups which were still working at liberty had been linked up directly with one another. ( I do not know all the details of how Schreieder and his section in a few days achieved the liquidation of the entire enemy MID-SOE network operating in Holland at that time. )

Without doubt lack of experience and gullibility played an important part on the other side. The agents were really amateurs, despite
their training in England, and they had had no opportunity to work up through practice to the standard required for their immensely difficult task. Generally speaking they could not have reached the standard of a specialist such as Schreieder.

Afu Trumpet had fallen into our hands complete with signal plan, operating and cipher material. The operator Jordaan collapsed when he discovered the extent of the disaster. He was a well-educated young man of good family, perhaps not developed or tough enough for the most dangerous of the jobs known to secret service—agent operating. But that wasn't his fault! Jordaan soon developed confidence in Huntemann and myself, and took the chance which we offered him of operating his transmitter, after we had succeeded in getting him through the nervous crisis which followed his transfer to Scheveningen. On 5th May we used Trumpet to open up a second radio link with London and passed a signal proposing a new dropping area for this group which we had found a few kilometres north of Holten. The line of communication developed smoothly, and evidently gave London no grounds for suspicion, for the dropping area was approved shortly afterward, and we accepted the first drop there about a fortnight later.
A third radio link with London was established in the following manner. The signal plan for Turnip belonging to the dead operator Maartens had been found on the person of the arrested agent Andringa. We signaled to London via Trumpet that Andringa had discovered a reliable operator who would be able to carry out Turnip’s signal plan using Maartens’ set, and London gave him a trial transmission so as to test the efficiency of this new recruit. The ORPO operator who took the test must have done it excellently, for the next signal from “over there” told him that he was approved. But we soon had new troubles, which worried me a lot.

About the middle of May Heinrichs reported anxiously to me that he and his men suspected Lauwers of having transmitted several additional letters at the end of his last routine period. It was in fact normal to put a series of so-called dummy letters at the end of signals, and his “overseer” had consequently not immediately switched off the set. His mistrust had, however, been aroused. Heinrichs could not himself be present during every transmission by Lauwers or Jordaan, and he requested urgently that the two operators should somehow be replaced by his own men. I saw the overseer concerned at once. The man declared that he did not know exactly what extra letters Lauwers had transmitted, but that they had had no meaning. The man knew quite well that any other answer could have brought him before a military court for treasonable negligence, but since nothing could be
proved one way or the other we had to await London’s reactions.

I brought in Huntemann to try and find out what had actually happened, as he was on very good terms with both the ORPO men and Lauwers. It emerged simply that Lauwers had made some of the ORPO men much too trusting, had “softened them up” as we put it. The routine periods had become much too comfortable, and the good treatment I had ordered for the operators, with coffee and cigarettes, had broadened into a friendship which was proving highly dangerous. While awaiting London’s reaction, I did not tell Lauwers that our suspicions had been aroused. Nevertheless, although there were no clear indications of treachery, we soon afterward put an end to the operating of Lauwers and Jordaan by once more using the trick of proposing a “reserve” operator — which was immediately approved.

We were now in a position to bring an ORPO man onto the key in place of either operator without London suspecting anything. The instruction and employment of reserve operators drawn from the Dutch Underground must have been quite understandable to them, as it was always possible that a mishap might occur to the No. 1 operator at any time. Profiting by these events, we did not in general use agent
operators any longer. After the arrest of agents sent across later on, their sets were operated from the outset by the ORPO without any turn-over period. In this procedure we ran the risk that the “hand-writing” might have been recorded in London (on a steel tape or gramophone) and that a comparison might easily give rise to suspicion. By means of touch, speed of operating and other individual characteristics of a transmission technique an experienced ear can detect the difference between different operators when on the key in exactly the same way as a musical ear can detect differences between the renderings of different masters.

If the radio organization of MID-SOE had observed proper security precautions we should never have been able to introduce our own ORPO operators. But since our experience hitherto had not disclosed any special degree of watchfulness on their part we took the risk. The carelessness of the enemy is illustrated by the fact that more than fourteen different radio links were established with London for longer or shorter periods during the “Nordpol” operation, and these fourteen were operated by six ORPO men!

In the course of the spring we had amassed a considerable store of knowledge about the enemy’s plans, his methods of operating and his radio and ciphering systems. With the help of this experience we could probably even have dealt with blind drops had any more taken place. If the enemy had discovered the truth at this time, he would have had
to rebuild a difficult, costly organizational structure, employing entirely new methods. Even making allowance for the fact that MID-SOE had not the slightest suspicion of the true state of affairs, it is a fact that the decision to drop “by arrangement” was the chief reason for the catastrophe which followed. This arrangement, which was carried out rigidly and without variation for over a year, was the really dramatic feature of “Nordpol” amid the many other mistakes of omission and commission made by our enemy.

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One single control group, dropped blind and unknown to us in Holland, with the sole duty of watching drops which had been arranged, could have punctured in an instant the whole gigantic bubble of Operation “Nordpol.” This unpleasant possibility was always before our eyes during the long months of the play-back, and it kept us from getting too sure of ourselves. We could never forget that each incoming or outgoing radio signal might be the last of the operation.

The decision of MID-SOE was confirmed when the period from 28th May to 29th June brought three dropping operations, for which the “reliable” groups Ebenezer and Trumpet had to provide the reception parties. The operations were:


Operation Marrow (via Ebenezer). Agents Jambroes and Bukkens dropped near Steenwijk on 26th June. Duties— organization of armed resistance in Holland. Radio in accordance with Plan Marrow.

The duties prescribed for parties Beetroot and Marrow were of such importance subsequently that I will discuss them in detail. The Beetroot party was welcomed on its arrival by Underground representatives who were in fact Dutch police working for the SIPO. The arrests were made after dawn, by which time the reception party had had time to find out what the duties of the group were to be. Actually this plan broke down in the case of Beetroot, but was highly successful in all the remaining cases. On subsequent occasions we often discovered important details from the enemy's side, particularly about their secret operational intentions. For example, a single operation gave us precise information about the agent radio schools in England, including the numbers under instruction, their nationality, the teach-
ing staff, standards of ability, etc. Later on our knowledge extended into an accurate picture of the inner circle of leading personalities “over there.”

Group Parsnip, which had been dropped on 22nd June near Holten, had a normal assignment, namely, the organization of a sabotage group in Overijssel. Parsnip was consequently played back normally by the customary process of opening up communication, agreeing on dropping points and accepting drops. It was noteworthy that the operator Buizer was, on London’s orders, also supposed to transmit for Potato (de Haas), Potato having previously worked through Ebenezer. Ebenezer’s burden had been lightened in this way because London considered it to be the most reliable of its links and intended soon to use it for an important special task— the blowing up of the aerial system of the Kootwijk radio transmitter.

At the beginning of July London told Ebenezer to make a reconnaissance to see whether the aerial system could be blown up by a demolition commando under Taconis. In a series of signals exact details were given of the method by which the whole system could be destroyed by means of small charges placed at special points among
the mast anchors. I accordingly sent out a reconnaissance party of our people under Willy, who were to conduct themselves exactly as if they were members of the Underground, to find out in what way it would be possible, by day or night, to approach the aerial system, and how the operation could then be carried out. The precise state of affairs as reported by Willy was then signaled to London. We reported a rather small guard, and an inadequate watch over the surrounding area. The demolition of the anchors would not present much difficulty. London signaled back that Taconis must make his preparations in such way that the demolition could be carried out on the night following the receipt of a prearranged signal.

Toward the end of July we reported that Taconis and his men were ready, and were told by London to stand by, but on no account to start anything before receiving the signal. By the time this signal came I had already thought out reasons for “failure.”

Two days later Ebenezer passed the following message to London: “Kootwijk attempt a failure. Some of our men ran into a minefield near the anchors. Explosions followed, then an engagement with the guards. Five men missing. Taconis and remainder safe, including two wounded.” And the next day: “Two of the five missing men returned. Three others were killed in action. Enemy has strengthened guard on Kootwijk and other stations. Have broken off all contact. No signs yet that enemy is on our track.” London signaled back somewhat as
follows: “Much regret your failure and losses. Method of defense is new and was not foreseeable. Cease all activity for the present. Greatest watchfulness necessary for some time. Report anything unusual.”

A fortnight later London sent Ebenezer a congratulatory message for the Kootwijk party, adding that Taconis would receive a British decoration for his leadership. The medal would be presented to him at the earliest opportunity.

The attack planned on the Kootwijk transmitter was clearly aimed at the destruction of the radio link by which the German Admiralty communicated with U-boats in the Atlantic. When some days later the English made their landing attempt on the French coast near Dieppe we saw another reason why Kootwijk had been intended to be destroyed. Somewhat late in the day, the German Admiralty hastened to carry into actuality the form of defense for the aerial system which we had conjured up in our imagination.

By arrangement with IC of the Wehrmacht staff, Rittmeister Jansen, I had a reference to the Kootwijk affair published in the Dutch
press. The article referred to criminal elements who had attempted to
blow up a wireless station in Holland. The attempt had been a failure,
and captured sabotage material had pointed to enemy assistance. The
law-abiding population was warned once again against committing or
supporting such acts. I hoped that my opponents in London would
receive this report by way of neutral countries.

A description of Operation Marrow which follows covers the
decisive phase of “Nordpol” from June, 1942 until the spring of 1943.

We knew from the first conversations on the night of the drop
what the tasks were which had been given in London to the leader of
Marrow, Jambroes, and his operator Bukkens, in broad outline. The
plans of MID-SOE, revealed by interrogation, were on a big scale
which underestimated the Abwehr potential on the German side.
Typical of this was the lack of understanding of the true position in
Holland concerning the morale of the population. There is no doubt
that the willingness of the mass of the people to participate directly or
indirectly in preparations for underground warfare did not correspond
with London’s expectations. It was not until one to two years later that
morale grew gradually more favorable toward such plans as a result of
the military defeats of the Third Reich, the growing Allied superiority
and repressive German actions both against the population and against
the economy of the western occupied areas.
By the terms of Plan Marrow, Jambroes, who was a Dutch Reserve officer, was to establish contact with the leader of the organization OD (Ordedienst) and get them to provide men to carry out the plans of MID-SOE. Sixteen groups, each of a hundred men, were to be organized all over the country as armed sabotage and resistance nuclei. Two agents from London, a group-leader-cum-instructor and a radio operator, were to take over the leadership, organization, training and arming of these groups. No doubt this plan looked fine from an armchair in London. But its fulfillment was postponed indefinitely by the fact that Jambroes never met the leaders of the OD.

It soon became clear to us that we could not play back Jambroes’ task, because as we did not know who were the leaders of the OD we would not be able to tell London what Jambroes had discussed with them—when Jambroes himself was all the time under arrest. So we had to put it to London that the task originally assigned to Jambroes was impracticable, and take action in accordance with what we imagined to be the true state of affairs. We now proceeded to overwhelm London with a flood of reports about signs of demoralization among the leaders of the OD. The leadership, we said, was so penetrated by German informers that direct contact with its members
as ordered by London would certainly attract the attention of the
Germans. When the replies from London began to show signs of
uncertainty and instructed Jambroes to be careful, we started a new
line. This proposed that Jambroes should make contact with individual
and reliable leaders from OD area groups, so as to form the sixteen
groups planned by consultation with the middle and lower OD levels.
Our proposal met with some objections, but was finally recognized in a
practical manner by the increasing of the support through agents and
material given to Group Marrow and its supposed component orga-
nizations.

The build-up of the Marrow organization began in August, 1942.
Naturally at no time were links established with OD groups or with
their leaders. On the contrary, we assured London repeatedly that we
were making use of more reliable and security-minded individuals.
The development of the sixteen Marrow groups had soon made such
apparent progress that between the end of September and November
London sent across seventeen agents through our hands in Holland,
most of whom were destined for Marrow groups. Five were operators
with independent radio links. We had these five lines in working order
by the end of November, operating in accordance with Plans Chive,
Broccoli, Cucumber, Tomato and Celery. Each of these five groups set
to work and were soon able to give dropping points to London, which
were approved and supplied continuously with materials. At the
beginning of December we signaled a progress report of the existing
state of the Marrow groups to London. According to this, about fifteen hundred men were under training, attached to eight Marrow groups. In practice, these training detachments would have had urgent need of such articles as clothing, underwear, footwear, bicycle tires, tobacco and tea. We accordingly asked for a supply of all these articles, and in the middle of December we received a consignment in thirty-two containers totaling some five thousand kilos, dropped in four different areas in the course of one night.

Our information indicated that a new party of agents had completed their training at the secret schools in England about the middle of January, in preparation for action in Flolland. From 18th January to 21st April 1943 seventeen more agents were dropped by MID-SOE and met by our reception parties. This time again the majority were group leaders and instructors for Marrow and other sabotage groups. One party of two men had intelligence tasks. Another two-man party was given the task of establishing a courier line from Holland via

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Brussels and Paris to Spain, and a single woman agent who arrived had been given intelligence duties. The newcomers included seven operators with independent radio links.
The agents supplied in the spring of 1943 fulfilled the requirements of personnel for the MID-SOE groups which had been planned in Holland. With my few assistants, I was faced with the problem of keeping London’s operational maps supplied with information about the multifarious activities of nearly fifty agents, and it seemed impossible that we could keep this up for long. To meet our difficulties an attempt had to be made to get London to agree to a reduction in the number of working radio links which were now available. We accordingly proposed “for reasons of greater security” to close down some of the Marrow transmitters. These sets, we said, would form a reserve in case some of the active transmitters and their operators should be knocked out by German action. We subsequently arrived at the position where of all the Marrow sets only Marrow I to Marrow V remained in operation.

Although several times between the autumn of 1942 and the summer of 1943 we had reported one of our controlled transmitters as having been knocked out by German action, we had been compelled at times to operate as many as fourteen lines simultaneously. A reduction in radio traffic was essential for the one reason alone that we had a maximum of six ORPO radio operators at our disposal for handling the entire radio traffic with London, and these men were being continually worked up to the very limits of their capacity.
This account of how agents were dropped direct into our arms has not yet described any efforts by MID-SOE to get knowledge of the true state of affairs in Holland. Though there was no lack of trying, these attempts never made allowance for the fact that a possibility did exist that the entire communication network and all the agents sent in were in German hands. The most noteworthy enemy attempt at control, which may perhaps have been one of a number which we did not recognize as such, occurred at the time of Operation Parsley on 21st September 1942. There was little doubt that the agent who was dropped, a certain Jongelie, cover-name “Arie,” had a control task. Shortly after his arrest Jongelie declared that in order to confirm his safe arrival he must at once signal to London: “The express left on time.” By saying this he put his SIPO interrogators in a quandary, a situation which they were meeting for the first time.

I had spent the night of the Parsley operation in the dropping area, which lay a few kilometres east of Assen, and had returned to The Hague at about 0700. At nine the telephone bell roused me from my slumbers, and the head interrogator of Schreieder’s section IVE informed me of what Jongelie had just said. He added that this message would apparently have to be dispatched at the first routine period at
Half an hour later I was sitting opposite Jongelie in the Bmnenhof.

He was a man of about forty, with a broad, leathery face, who for a long time had been chief operator for the Dutch naval headquarters in Batavia. After a short conversation it was quite clear that Jongelie had developed some Asiatic cunning during his long period of service in Indonesia. With an unnaturally immobile face, he answered my pressing questions repeatedly with the statement that he must pass the message “The express left on time” at 1100 or London would realize that he was in German hands. Finally I pretended to be convinced.

Seemingly deep in thought, I said that we would pass his message at 1100— and then, as I suddenly raised my eyes, a gleam of triumph appeared in his. So this was treachery! At 1100 we passed the following message: “Accident has occurred in Operation Parsley. Arie landed heavily and is unconscious. He is safe and in good hands. Doctor diagnoses severe concussion. Further report will be made. All material safe.” Three days later we signaled: “Arie regained consciousness for short period yesterday. Doctor hopes for an improvement.

And the next day the message ran: “Arie died suddenly yesterday without regaining consciousness. We will bury him on the moor. We hope to give him a worthy memorial after victory is won.

I have related this case in detail as an example of how competent
tough agents, who had been appropriately prepared in London, could easily have forced us into the position where a single treacherous report would have blown the gaff. All we could do in such cases was to pretend that the man was dead or that he had been arrested by the Germans. A series of such “accidents” would probably always have been less dangerous than the possibility of treachery. Shortly after the Arie incident London began to press us to send Jambroes, the head of the Marrow groups, back to London for consultation, Jambroes having to name a deputy to act for him in his absence. This request accorded with the man’s earlier statements that after three months of preparatory activity in Holland he would be required back in England. A reference to the possibilities of Jambroes’ journey was now never absent from our interchange of signals. At first we described him as indispensable due to unforeseen difficulties in the building up of the sixteen groups, and in due course we found new excuses, in which the difficult and lengthy journey by the insecure courier route into Spain played the principal part.

Nineteen forty-two went by in this way. At the beginning of 1943 the requests from London for a personal report became more urgent and were now broadened to include representatives from other groups. Innumerable signals passed. London began to demand information...
about areas in Holland where land or sea planes could be sent to pick up couriers or agents. We were unable to find suitable areas, or, alternatively, those which we did find and reported did not suit the gentlemen “over there”— or else we would suddenly declare them unsafe, whenever the organization of a special flight seemed imminent.

On various occasions we reported a number of agents as having departed for France, who were expected every month to arrive, but naturally never did so. Finally we took the only course still open to us and reported Jambroes as missing . . . informing London that our investigations showed that he could not be traced subsequent to a German police raid in Rotterdam. . . .

On 18th January 1943 Group Golf was dropped into Holland. Golf’s duties were to prepare secure courier routes through Belgium and France to Spain and Switzerland. The group was well supplied with blanks for Dutch, Belgian and French identity cards with stamps and dies for the forging of German passes of all kinds, and with francs and pesetas. We let about six weeks pass before Golf signaled to London that a reliable and secure route had been established as far as Paris. The courier for the Golf groups would be an experienced man with cover name “Arnaud.” In actual fact Amaud was none other than
my Unteroffizier Amo, who had effected an excellent penetration of
the enemy courier routes by posing as a refugee Frenchman who made
his living by smuggling jewels. We proposed to London that we
should dispatch to Spain via the Amaud route two English flying
officers who were living underground in Holland in order to test the
reliability of this “escape line.” Our proposal was approved, and
London confirmed three weeks later that the men had arrived safely in
Spain.

Through this exploit, the Golf group and Amaud acquired much
credit in London, and in the spring and summer of 1943 London gave
us details of three active stations of the British Secret Service in Paris
which were working on escape routes. These were run partly by
French and partly by English personnel and had their own radio links
with London. Obviously we did not permit the German counter-
espionage in Paris to take action against these stations, once more
adhering to the principle that intelligence is more valuable than
elimination. My section under Major Wieskotter now had a clear view
of the inner working of these important escape lines, made possible by
the well-sponsored arrival of Arnaud in the organization by reason of a
signaled recommendation by London to the stations concerned.

The responsibility for innumerable captures of couriers and
espionage material, of incoming and outgoing agents, and of espionage
and radio centers in Holland and Belgium during 1943, inexplicable to
the enemy Secret Services, must be laid at the door of MID-SOE's confidence in the Golf radio link, which had been in our hands since the day of its arrival in Holland. In actual fact Golf rendered certain services to the enemy in order to increase this confidence.

We had proved once again the truth of the old saying: “Give and it shall be given unto you.” Numbers of Allied flying personnel who had been shot down and had gone underground in Holland and Belgium had reached Spain after an adventurous journey without ever knowing, perhaps until the present day, that they had all the time been under the wing of the German counterespionage.

On 31st August, Queen’s Day in Holland, two “Nordpol” agents, Ubbink and Dourlein, broke out of the prison in Haaren and disappeared. I had a short report to this effect on the morning of 1st September from Schreieder’s office. Soon afterward Schreieder himself rang up in considerable agitation to give me a seemingly endless description of the measures which he had taken for their recapture. It was clear to me that, through this incident, the bottom had been knocked out of the whole “Nordpol” operation. Even if the fugitives did not succeed in reaching Spain, Switzerland or even England itself,
they were at large—though perhaps only temporarily—and would certainly somehow record their experiences since their departure from England and get this report by some means or other back across the Channel.

During the first ten days of December London’s signals became so dull and colorless compared with their usual quality that it did not need all our knowledge to enable us to guess that the enemy was trying to deceive us in his turn. Hardly any doubt remained that Ubbink and Dourlein had reached their objective. Nevertheless, we made no move, and gave not the slightest indication that we too realized that the great bubble of the agent network and radio links in Holland had been finally pricked.

In March, 1944, I proposed to Berlin that we should put an end to the hollow mockery of the “Nordpol” radio links by means of a final message. I was immediately told to submit a draft for approval to Abwehr Berlin, which must express confidence in victory. Huntemann and I set ourselves to compose a message which should fulfill not only Berlin’s requirements but also our reflections on the two years hoax which we had carried out so successfully. This message, the first to be transmitted quite openly in plain language, must not in any way fall short of the standard of the thousand-odd cipher signals which had been previously dispatched. We sat at my desk and exchanged our first attempts at a suitable text in order to discover something worthy of
this unique occasion. Writing rather as if we were playing “conse-
quences,” each of us composing a few sentences in turn, we finally
agreed on the following:

To Messrs. Blunt, Bingham & Co., Successors Ltd., London. We understand
that you have been endeavoring for some time to do business in Holland
without our assistance. We regret this the more since we have acted for so
long as your sole representatives in this country, to our mutual satisfaction.
Nevertheless we can assure you that, should you be thinking of paying
us a visit on the Continent on any extensive scale, we shall give your emis-
saries the same attention as we have hitherto, and a similarly warm wel-
come. Hoping to see you.

The names given were those of the men whom we knew to be at
the head of the Netherlands section of SOE. We signaled this draft to
Berlin for their approval. They were evidently occupied with more
important matters, however, and we had to wait a fortnight until, after
one or two reminders, we received permission to transmit the message
without amendment.
I passed the plain language text to the FuB station on 31st March, with instructions to pass it to England over all the fines controlled by us, which at that time numbered ten, the next day. It had occurred to me that 1st April might be particularly apposite.

The following afternoon the FuB station reported that London had accepted the message on four fines, but had not answered calls on the other six . . .

Operation “Nordpol” was over.

The attempt of the Allied Secret Services to gain a foothold in Holland had been delayed by two years. The establishment of armed sabotage and terror organizations, which might have disorganized the rear areas of the Atlantic Wall and crippled our defenses at the critical moment of invasion, had been prevented. The penetration of the Underground movement had led to the liquidation of widely spread and boldly directed enemy espionage services. The complete deception of the enemy about the real state of affairs in Holland would have subjected him to the danger of a heavy defeat had he attempted to attack during 1942 or 1943. The information which we had gained about the activities and intentions of the enemy Secret Services had contributed directly to the countering of corresponding plans in other countries.
Operation “Nordpol” was no more than a drop in the ocean of blood and tears, of the suffering and destruction of the Second World War. It remains none the less a noteworthy page in the chequered and adventurous story of Secret Service, a story which is as old as humanity and as war itself.